BITCOIN · BIP-110(RDTS)· LIVE

BIP-110 会"强制生效"吗?会,但只在一条没人跟的链上 Will BIP-110 "force-activate"? Yes — but only on a chain nobody follows

Reduced Data Temporary Softfork:为期一年的临时软分叉,限制链上任意数据(Ordinals / Runes / BRC-20)。它的激活机制没有失败状态,8 月强制窗口后必然"生效"——问题只是对谁生效。

The Reduced Data Temporary Softfork: a one-year soft fork restricting arbitrary on-chain data (Ordinals / Runes / BRC-20). Its deployment has no failure state — after the August mandatory window it "activates" no matter what. The only question is: for whom.

数据加载中…Loading… 块高 Height 信号率 Signal 强制窗口 Window ≈8月7日≈Aug 7 激活上限 Activation ≈9月3日≈Sep 3

矿工信号率 vs 提前锁定阈值Miner signal rate vs early lock-in threshold

难度周期 —Difficulty period —
—% 55% 阈值差约 两个数量级 · Two orders of magnitude below the 55% threshold ·
55% 提前锁定线55% early lock-in line
0%25%50%75%100%
距强制窗口(块 961,632)To mandatory window (block 961,632)
当前块高Current height
信号来源Signal source OCEAN 为主Mostly OCEAN 默认端点 7/15 起信号 · F2Pool 联创称不签Default endpoint signals since 7/15 · F2Pool co-founder says no

关键:55% 不是"生死线",只是提前锁定通道——达不到也照样按高度激活(见下)。

Key point: 55% is not pass/fail — it is only the early lock-in path. Miss it and activation still happens by block height (see below).

三个最容易搞错的机制点The three most misunderstood mechanics

本页的核心修正——直觉模型 vs 规范实际写的The core corrections: intuition vs what the spec actually says

误区 ①Misconception #1

这不是投票——机制里没有失败状态This is not a vote — there is no failure state

直觉模型"支持率不到 55% 就不会生效"是错的。部署参数为 NO_TIMEOUT,规范里不存在 FAILED 状态:不管矿工信号多少,到指定块高必然按高度激活。这是 UASF 最后通牒,不是公投——也正是 Saylor 们反对的核心。

The intuitive model — "below 55% support it won't activate" — is wrong. The deployment is NO_TIMEOUT; the spec has no FAILED state: whatever miners signal, activation happens at the target height. It is a UASF ultimatum, not a referendum — exactly what Saylor and others object to.

误区 ②Misconception #2

没有"反对"标签——沉默就是 NoThere is no "oppose" flag — silence counts as No

信号机制只有一个 bit(版本字段 bit 4):置位 = 支持,不置位 = 现状 = 计为不支持。不存在显式的反对标记。未信号在计票上一律计为不支持——但这只是计票事实;公司立场是另一回事,见下方阵营区块(无一手表态标 UNKNOWN)。

Signaling is a single bit (version bit 4): set = support, unset = status quo = counted as not supporting. There is no explicit "no" marker. Not signaling always counts against the threshold — but that is a tallying fact, not a corporate stance; see the stance section below (no primary statement → UNKNOWN).

关键问题The key question

"块被拒绝"?要问被谁拒绝"Blocks get rejected"? Rejected by whom?

强制窗口内不信号的块,只在 ~1% 的 Knots enforcing 节点眼里无效;对 Bitcoin Core(~99% 经济体量)完全有效——Core 里根本没有这个 deployment。大池不信号:块照出、奖励照拿、交易所照认,拒绝它的人只把自己隔离出去。

During the mandatory window, a non-signaling block is invalid only to the ~1% of enforcing Knots nodes. To Bitcoin Core (~99% of economic weight) it is fully valid — Core doesn't ship this deployment at all. A silent major pool keeps mining, keeps rewards, keeps exchange acceptance; the rejecters only isolate themselves.

强制窗口内,不信号的块被谁拒绝?During the window, who rejects a non-signaling block?

同一个块,两种世界观——这就是"拒绝"威胁空转的原因Same block, two worldviews — why the "rejection" threat is toothless

Bitcoin Core 节点Bitcoin Core nodes~99% 经济体量 · 无 BIP110 部署~99% economic weight · no BIP110 deployment
接受Accepts
交易所 / 钱包 / 商户Exchanges / wallets / merchants经济多数 · 无人跟进 enforcingeconomic majority · none enforcing
接受Accepts
Knots enforcing 节点Knots enforcing nodes低个位数 % · v29.3 起默认 enforcelow single digits % · enforced by default since v29.3
拒绝Rejects

时间表(块高驱动,日期为实时估算)Timeline (height-driven; dates are live estimates)

规范写死的高度 · ETA 按最近实际出块速度折算Heights fixed by the spec · ETAs from recent actual block pace

今天today

当前状态:信号率 —Current: signal rate —

当前信号块带 OCEAN coinbase tag(不等同其全量算力或公司立场)。OCEAN 默认 Stratum 端点 7/15 起改为信号;Foundry / AntPool / ViaBTC 无可核验一手表态(UNKNOWN)。

Current signaling blocks carry an OCEAN coinbase tag (≠ all of its hashrate, ≠ corporate stance). OCEAN's default Stratum endpoint signals since 7/15; Foundry / AntPool / ViaBTC have no verifiable primary statement (UNKNOWN).

961,632约 2026-08-07≈Aug 7, 2026

强制信号窗口开启 → 实际分裂点Mandatory signaling window opens → the actual split point

Enforcing 节点(Knots BIP110)开始拒绝一切不信号 bit 4 的块。第一个不信号块出现(按当前算力分布,几分钟内)即为链分裂时刻——比 9 月的"激活"早得多。

Enforcing nodes (Knots BIP110) start rejecting every block that doesn't signal bit 4. The first non-signaling block (minutes away, at current hashrate) is the split — well before September's "activation."

963,648约 2026-08 下旬≈late Aug 2026

强制锁定(Lock-in)Mandatory lock-in

规范写死:不晚于此高度锁定。没有 FAILED 状态(timeout = NO_TIMEOUT)——55% 矿工信号只是"提前锁定"通道,信号多少都不影响这一步。

Fixed by the spec: locked in no later than this height. No FAILED state (timeout = NO_TIMEOUT) — the 55% path is merely early lock-in; signaling levels cannot change this step.

965,664约 2026-09-01≈Sep 1, 2026

规则激活Rules activate

7 条数据限制生效:新输出 ≤34 字节、OP_RETURN ≤83 字节、数据推送 ≤256 字节,针对 Ordinals / Runes / BRC-20。激活前的旧 UTXO 永久豁免。

Seven data limits take effect: new outputs ≤34 bytes, OP_RETURN ≤83 bytes, data pushes ≤256 bytes — aimed at Ordinals / Runes / BRC-20. Pre-activation UTXOs are grandfathered forever.

+52,416 块+52,416 blocks约 2027-09≈Sep 2027

自动过期Auto-expiry

激活约一年后规则自动失效,写死在规范里,无需再投票。

Rules expire about one year after activation, hard-coded in the spec; no further vote needed.

注意:这是软分叉规则导致的永久链分裂,不是严格意义的硬分叉。RDTS 规则是主链规则的子集,所以不对称:RDTS 块对主链有效(无重放保护;理论上若其累计工作量反超,主链节点会自动 reorg 过去——这是 UASF 的博弈武器,1% 算力下是空炮),而主链对 RDTS 节点永久无效,反向吞并不存在。

Note: this is a permanent chain split caused by soft-fork rules, not a hard fork in the strict sense. RDTS rules are a subset of mainchain rules, so the split is asymmetric: RDTS blocks are valid to the mainchain (no replay protection; in theory, if RDTS ever led on cumulative work, mainchain nodes would auto-reorg onto it — the UASF's game-theory weapon, an empty cannon at 1% hashrate), while mainchain blocks are permanently invalid to RDTS nodes; absorption never runs the other way.

分裂之后:两条链的物理学After the split: the physics of two chains

不改难度调整算法(DAA),少数链的死亡是算术,不是观点Without changing the DAA, the minority chain's death is arithmetic, not opinion

块 961,632 · 强制窗口开启Block 961,632 · window opens 第一个不信号块 = 分裂点(~8月7日)first non-signaling block = the split (~Aug 7) 主链 · ~99% 算力 · 10 分钟/块Main chain · ~99% hashrate · 10 min/block RDTS 分支 · ~1% 算力 · 17-33 小时/块RDTS branch · ~1% hashrate · 17–33 h/block

主链(Core)Main chain (Core)Ordinals 照常 · 经济活动全部在此Ordinals continue · all economic activity here

算力Hashrate~99%(丢 1% 难度几乎不动)~99% (losing 1% barely moves difficulty)
出块Block time~10 分钟/块,无感~10 min/block, unaffected
对矿池的后果Consequence for pools块照出 · 奖励照拿 · 交易所照认Blocks mined · rewards kept · exchanges accept

RDTS 分支(Knots enforcing)RDTS branch (Knots enforcing)BIP110 代码未改 DAA——龟速时钟BIP110 code leaves the DAA untouched — a snail clock

算力Hashrate~5-10 EH/s(可能比 1% 信号率还低)~5–10 EH/s (maybe below the 1% signal rate)
出块Block time17-33 小时/块17–33 hours/block
第一次难度调整(2016 块)First retarget (2016 blocks)3.8-7.6 年后 · 每次最多 ÷43.8–7.6 years away · max ÷4 per step
最讽刺的细节The cruelest detail按自己的时钟,~7 年才爬到自己的激活高度by its own clock, ~7 years to reach its own activation height
死亡螺旋:coinbase 奖励没有市场价 → 理性矿工流失 → 出块更慢 → 难度调整更遥远。2017 年 BCH 靠紧急难度调整(EDA)硬分叉才活下来——正是"不改 DAA 的少数链必死"的实证。
Death spiral: coinbase rewards without a market price → rational miners leave → blocks slow further → the retarget recedes. In 2017, BCH survived only via an emergency difficulty adjustment (EDA) hard fork — empirical proof that a minority chain that doesn't change its DAA dies.
"分支未遂"形态(见概率卡 ②):若 enforcing 矿工也临阵脱逃,Knots 用户连分支都没有——节点直接冻结在块 961,631,等人手工投降。
The "no-branch" shape (see outcome #2): if even the enforcing miners defect, Knots users get no branch at all — their nodes freeze at block 961,631, waiting for a manual surrender.

结局概率Outcome probabilities

主观概率 · 2026-07-15 二次修订(60/35/4/1,尾部再压缩)· 可证伪条件:信号率突破 10% 或大池公开表态Subjective · 2nd revision 2026-07-15 (60/35/4/1, tails compressed) · falsifiers: signal rate above 10% or a major pool's public statement

分裂成链:RDTS 分支爬行后自发消亡A live RDTS branch forms, crawls, then dies

~60%

8月7日窗口开启即在节点层分裂;活链还要求 enforcing 矿工真的以 17-33 小时/块持续出块直至自然消亡。注意:当前信号多来自 OCEAN 默认端点的"廉价信号",信号 ≠ 愿意在无市场价的链上烧电——这个落差是本项从 90% 下调的主因。

Node-level divergence at the Aug-7 window is near-certain; a living branch additionally requires enforcing miners to keep mining at 17–33 h/block until the chain starves. Today's signals are mostly "cheap signaling" via OCEAN's default endpoint — signaling ≠ burning power on an unpriced chain. That gap is why this was revised down from 90%.

分支未遂:enforcing 矿工临阵退缩,无实质活链No real branch: enforcing miners defect at the moment of truth

~35%

信号免费,enforce 昂贵。若窗口开启后没人持续在 RDTS 侧出块,Knots enforcing 节点冻结在块 961,631(或运营者换回非 enforcing 构建投降),"分裂"停留在节点视角分歧,从未成为一条活链。OCEAN 自己已宣布双链后端——主信号池也在对冲而非承诺。

Signaling is free; enforcing is costly. If nobody keeps mining the RDTS side after the window opens, enforcing Knots nodes freeze at block 961,631 (or operators swap to the non-enforcing build and capitulate). The "split" stays a node-view divergence and never becomes a living chain. OCEAN itself announced a dual-chain backend — even the main signaling pool is hedging, not committing.

尾部风险:大池临近窗口翻牌Tail risk: a major pool flips near the window

~4%

"孤块压力"只在 enforcing 侧有分量时才成立——当前 ~1% 威慑不了任何大池;真实威胁还需要经济多数(交易所/钱包)跟进 enforcing,2017 BIP148 的剧本这次没有凑齐。距窗口三周,零迹象。

Orphan pressure only exists if the enforcing side has weight — at ~1% it deters no major pool. A real threat also needs the economic majority (exchanges/wallets) to enforce, and the 2017 BIP148 script hasn't assembled. Three weeks out: zero signs.

55% 达标、主链正常激活55% reached, normal mainchain activation

~1%

需要单个难度周期内 55% 块信号;当前差两个数量级且大池零动作,<1.5%。

Requires 55% of blocks in one retarget period; two orders of magnitude away with zero major-pool movement — below 1.5%.

阵营与表态(按证据强度)Stances (by strength of evidence)

计票上不信号即计为不支持——但立场是另一回事:无一手表态只标 UNKNOWN,不编造Not signaling counts as "no" in the tally — but stance is separate: no primary statement → UNKNOWN, nothing fabricated

OCEAN 信号块主要来源main source of signaling blocks

提供 signaling / no-signal 双端点;默认 Stratum 端点 2026-07-15 起改为信号(不愿信号的矿工可切 no-signal 端点)。约 95% 算力走 DATUM,模板与信号仍由矿工自选;7/13 宣布若链分裂后端将双链独立跟随。官方公告 ↗

Runs both signaling and no-signal endpoints; the default Stratum endpoint signals as of 2026-07-15 (miners can switch to no-signal). ~95% of its hashrate uses DATUM, where each miner picks templates and signaling; on 7/13 it announced split-ready backends following both chains. Official announcement ↗

F2Pool 联创 Chun Wang · 非正式co-founder Chun Wang · informal

Chun Wang(@satofishi):"No way we'll signal BIP-110"——个人帖,非正式公司公告。原帖 ↗

Chun Wang (@satofishi): "No way we'll signal BIP-110" — a personal post, not an official company statement. Post ↗

Michael Saylor Strategy · 非矿工Strategy · not a miner

7月11日 X 帖:"there are 110 things more dangerous to Bitcoin than spam"——为 spam 之争动共识规则、让现行有效的付费交易失效,先例比 spam 危险。注意:他不是矿工,无算力投票权。

July 11 on X: "there are 110 things more dangerous to Bitcoin than spam" — changing consensus rules over a spam dispute and invalidating currently-valid fee-paying transactions is a worse precedent than the spam itself. Note: he is not a miner and holds no hashrate vote.

Adam Back / Jameson Lopp Blockstream · Casa · 非矿工Blockstream · Casa · not miners

Back:提案与去中心化、无许可设计冲突,警告真实的链分裂风险。Lopp:55% 阈值太低,大幅加剧分裂概率。

Back: the proposal conflicts with Bitcoin's decentralized, permissionless design; warns of real split risk. Lopp: the 55% threshold is too low, sharply raising split odds.

Foundry / AntPool / ViaBTC UNKNOWN

截至 2026-07-15 检索截止,未找到可核验的一手表态。链上事实:未信号(计票上计为不支持)——但不据此推断公司立场,也不编造链接。

As of the 2026-07-15 search cutoff, no verifiable primary statement found. On-chain fact: not signaling (counts as "no" in the tally) — we do not infer corporate stance from that, nor fabricate links.

Luke Dashjr / Knots 阵营Luke Dashjr / the Knots camp Bitcoin Knots

"BIP110 is activating regardless of miner signaling. Miners do not control the protocol." 援引 2017 BIP148 逼 SegWit 的先例——但当年有经济多数背书,这次没有。原帖 ↗

"BIP110 is activating regardless of miner signaling. Miners do not control the protocol." Cites the 2017 BIP148/SegWit precedent — which had economic-majority backing; this one doesn't. Post ↗

来源Sources

BIP-110 规范全文(bips.dev)BIP-110 full specification (bips.dev) 实时信号监控 bip110monitor.comLive signaling monitor bip110monitor.com 官方站 bip110.org / 代码解读Official site bip110.org / code walkthrough mempool.space(块高/难度数据源)mempool.space (height/difficulty source) OCEAN 端点公告:默认 7/15 起信号(X, 2026-07-08)OCEAN endpoint announcement: default signals from 7/15 (X, 2026-07-08) Chun Wang "No way we'll signal"(X 个人帖)Chun Wang "No way we'll signal" (X, personal) Luke Dashjr "activating regardless"(X)Luke Dashjr "activating regardless" (X) CoinDesk:fork deadline nears with miner support at zero(2026-07-12)CoinDesk: fork deadline nears with miner support at zero (2026-07-12) Saylor "110 things more dangerous than spam"(2026-07-12)Saylor "110 things more dangerous than spam" (2026-07-12) Adam Back 与 Saylor 反对 BIP110(crypto.news)Adam Back & Saylor oppose BIP110 (crypto.news)

块高/难度实时来自 mempool.space,信号率来自 bip110monitor.com(5 分钟缓存)· 分析与概率为 2026-07-15 快照的主观判断,非投资建议 · 立场区块只列可核验一手表态,无一手链接不列 URL

Heights/difficulty live from mempool.space; signal rate from bip110monitor.com (5-min cache) · Analysis and probabilities are subjective as of the 2026-07-15 snapshot; not investment advice · The stance section lists only verifiable primary statements; no URL is fabricated.