BIP-110 会"强制生效"吗?会,但只在一条没人跟的链上Will BIP-110 "force-activate"? Yes — but only on a chain nobody follows
Reduced Data Temporary Softfork:为期一年的临时软分叉,限制链上任意数据(Ordinals / Runes / BRC-20)。它的激活机制没有失败状态,8 月强制窗口后必然"生效"——问题只是对谁生效。
The Reduced Data Temporary Softfork: a one-year soft fork restricting arbitrary on-chain data (Ordinals / Runes / BRC-20). Its deployment has no failure state — after the August mandatory window it "activates" no matter what. The only question is: for whom.
The intuitive model — "below 55% support it won't activate" — is wrong. The deployment is NO_TIMEOUT; the spec has no FAILED state: whatever miners signal, activation happens at the target height. It is a UASF ultimatum, not a referendum — exactly what Saylor and others object to.
误区 ②Misconception #2
没有"反对"标签——沉默就是 NoThere is no "oppose" flag — silence counts as No
Signaling is a single bit (version bit 4): set = support, unset = status quo = counted as not supporting. There is no explicit "no" marker. Not signaling always counts against the threshold — but that is a tallying fact, not a corporate stance; see the stance section below (no primary statement → UNKNOWN).
关键问题The key question
"块被拒绝"?要问被谁拒绝"Blocks get rejected"? Rejected by whom?
During the mandatory window, a non-signaling block is invalid only to the ~1% of enforcing Knots nodes. To Bitcoin Core (~99% of economic weight) it is fully valid — Core doesn't ship this deployment at all. A silent major pool keeps mining, keeps rewards, keeps exchange acceptance; the rejecters only isolate themselves.
强制窗口内,不信号的块被谁拒绝?During the window, who rejects a non-signaling block?
同一个块,两种世界观——这就是"拒绝"威胁空转的原因Same block, two worldviews — why the "rejection" threat is toothless
Current signaling blocks carry an OCEAN coinbase tag (≠ all of its hashrate, ≠ corporate stance). OCEAN's default Stratum endpoint signals since 7/15; Foundry / AntPool / ViaBTC have no verifiable primary statement (UNKNOWN).
961,632约 2026-08-07≈Aug 7, 2026
强制信号窗口开启 → 实际分裂点Mandatory signaling window opens → the actual split point
Enforcing 节点(Knots BIP110)开始拒绝一切不信号 bit 4 的块。第一个不信号块出现(按当前算力分布,几分钟内)即为链分裂时刻——比 9 月的"激活"早得多。
Enforcing nodes (Knots BIP110) start rejecting every block that doesn't signal bit 4. The first non-signaling block (minutes away, at current hashrate) is the split — well before September's "activation."
Fixed by the spec: locked in no later than this height. No FAILED state (timeout = NO_TIMEOUT) — the 55% path is merely early lock-in; signaling levels cannot change this step.
Seven data limits take effect: new outputs ≤34 bytes, OP_RETURN ≤83 bytes, data pushes ≤256 bytes — aimed at Ordinals / Runes / BRC-20. Pre-activation UTXOs are grandfathered forever.
+52,416 块+52,416 blocks约 2027-09≈Sep 2027
自动过期Auto-expiry
激活约一年后规则自动失效,写死在规范里,无需再投票。
Rules expire about one year after activation, hard-coded in the spec; no further vote needed.
Note: this is a permanent chain split caused by soft-fork rules, not a hard fork in the strict sense. RDTS rules are a subset of mainchain rules, so the split is asymmetric: RDTS blocks are valid to the mainchain (no replay protection; in theory, if RDTS ever led on cumulative work, mainchain nodes would auto-reorg onto it — the UASF's game-theory weapon, an empty cannon at 1% hashrate), while mainchain blocks are permanently invalid to RDTS nodes; absorption never runs the other way.
分裂之后:两条链的物理学After the split: the physics of two chains
不改难度调整算法(DAA),少数链的死亡是算术,不是观点Without changing the DAA, the minority chain's death is arithmetic, not opinion
主链(Core)Main chain (Core)Ordinals 照常 · 经济活动全部在此Ordinals continue · all economic activity here
Death spiral: coinbase rewards without a market price → rational miners leave → blocks slow further → the retarget recedes. In 2017, BCH survived only via an emergency difficulty adjustment (EDA) hard fork — empirical proof that a minority chain that doesn't change its DAA dies.
The "no-branch" shape (see outcome #2): if even the enforcing miners defect, Knots users get no branch at all — their nodes freeze at block 961,631, waiting for a manual surrender.
结局概率Outcome probabilities
主观概率 · 2026-07-15 二次修订(60/35/4/1,尾部再压缩)· 可证伪条件:信号率突破 10% 或大池公开表态Subjective · 2nd revision 2026-07-15 (60/35/4/1, tails compressed) · falsifiers: signal rate above 10% or a major pool's public statement
分裂成链:RDTS 分支爬行后自发消亡A live RDTS branch forms, crawls, then dies
Node-level divergence at the Aug-7 window is near-certain; a living branch additionally requires enforcing miners to keep mining at 17–33 h/block until the chain starves. Today's signals are mostly "cheap signaling" via OCEAN's default endpoint — signaling ≠ burning power on an unpriced chain. That gap is why this was revised down from 90%.
分支未遂:enforcing 矿工临阵退缩,无实质活链No real branch: enforcing miners defect at the moment of truth
Signaling is free; enforcing is costly. If nobody keeps mining the RDTS side after the window opens, enforcing Knots nodes freeze at block 961,631 (or operators swap to the non-enforcing build and capitulate). The "split" stays a node-view divergence and never becomes a living chain. OCEAN itself announced a dual-chain backend — even the main signaling pool is hedging, not committing.
尾部风险:大池临近窗口翻牌Tail risk: a major pool flips near the window
Orphan pressure only exists if the enforcing side has weight — at ~1% it deters no major pool. A real threat also needs the economic majority (exchanges/wallets) to enforce, and the 2017 BIP148 script hasn't assembled. Three weeks out: zero signs.
55% 达标、主链正常激活55% reached, normal mainchain activation
~1%
需要单个难度周期内 55% 块信号;当前差两个数量级且大池零动作,<1.5%。
Requires 55% of blocks in one retarget period; two orders of magnitude away with zero major-pool movement — below 1.5%.
阵营与表态(按证据强度)Stances (by strength of evidence)
计票上不信号即计为不支持——但立场是另一回事:无一手表态只标 UNKNOWN,不编造Not signaling counts as "no" in the tally — but stance is separate: no primary statement → UNKNOWN, nothing fabricated
Runs both signaling and no-signal endpoints; the default Stratum endpoint signals as of 2026-07-15 (miners can switch to no-signal). ~95% of its hashrate uses DATUM, where each miner picks templates and signaling; on 7/13 it announced split-ready backends following both chains. Official announcement ↗
F2Pool 联创 Chun Wang · 非正式co-founder Chun Wang · informal
Chun Wang(@satofishi):"No way we'll signal BIP-110"——个人帖,非正式公司公告。原帖 ↗
Chun Wang (@satofishi): "No way we'll signal BIP-110" — a personal post, not an official company statement. Post ↗
Michael Saylor Strategy · 非矿工Strategy · not a miner
7月11日 X 帖:"there are 110 things more dangerous to Bitcoin than spam"——为 spam 之争动共识规则、让现行有效的付费交易失效,先例比 spam 危险。注意:他不是矿工,无算力投票权。
July 11 on X: "there are 110 things more dangerous to Bitcoin than spam" — changing consensus rules over a spam dispute and invalidating currently-valid fee-paying transactions is a worse precedent than the spam itself. Note: he is not a miner and holds no hashrate vote.
Adam Back / Jameson Lopp Blockstream · Casa · 非矿工Blockstream · Casa · not miners
Back: the proposal conflicts with Bitcoin's decentralized, permissionless design; warns of real split risk. Lopp: the 55% threshold is too low, sharply raising split odds.
As of the 2026-07-15 search cutoff, no verifiable primary statement found. On-chain fact: not signaling (counts as "no" in the tally) — we do not infer corporate stance from that, nor fabricate links.
Luke Dashjr / Knots 阵营Luke Dashjr / the Knots campBitcoin Knots
"BIP110 is activating regardless of miner signaling. Miners do not control the protocol." 援引 2017 BIP148 逼 SegWit 的先例——但当年有经济多数背书,这次没有。原帖 ↗
"BIP110 is activating regardless of miner signaling. Miners do not control the protocol." Cites the 2017 BIP148/SegWit precedent — which had economic-majority backing; this one doesn't. Post ↗
Heights/difficulty live from mempool.space; signal rate from bip110monitor.com (5-min cache) · Analysis and probabilities are subjective as of the 2026-07-15 snapshot; not investment advice · The stance section lists only verifiable primary statements; no URL is fabricated.